- Tor relays and bridges
- Connecting to Tor automatically
- Hiding to your local network that you are connecting to Tor
- Viewing the status of Tor
- Troubleshooting connecting to Tor
Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network.
Tor encrypts and anonymizes your connection by passing it through 3 relays. Torrelays are servers operated by different people and organizations around theworld.
You cannot access the Internet from Tails until you are connected to Tor. Forexample, Tor Browser displays the error message The proxyserver is refusing connections
until you are connected to Tor.
Because Tor routes your Internet traffic through 3 relaysbefore reaching its destination, theconnection is slower than when you are not using Tor.
See our documentation onwhy Tor is slow.
To connect to the Tor network:
Connect to a local network, wired, Wi-Fi, or mobile.
The Tor Connection assistant appears to help you connect to the Tor network.
Choose whether you want to:
Connect to Tor automatically
Hide to your local network that you are connecting to Tor
The implications of both methods are detailed below.
Public Tor relays
Most of the time, your local network does not block access to the Tor networkand you can use a public relay as your first Tor relay.
Using a public Tor relay as your first Tor relay makes it clear to your localnetwork that you are connecting to Tor, while still keeping your onlineactivity secure and anonymous.
Tor bridges
Tor bridges are secret Tor relays that keep your connection to the Tornetwork hidden.
Use a bridge as your first Tor relay if connecting to Tor is blocked or ifusing Tor could look suspicious to someone who monitors your Internetconnection.
The technology used by Tor bridges is designed to circumvent censorshipwhere connections to Tor are blocked, for example in some countries with heavy censorship,by some public networks, or by some parental controls.
It does so by camouflaging your connection so it cannot be recognized as aconnection to Tor. As a consequence, the same technology can be used to hidethat you are using Tor if it could look suspicious to someone who monitorsyour Internet connection.
Tor bridges are often less reliable and slower than public Tor relays.
We recommend connecting to Tor automatically if you are on a public Wi-Finetwork or if many people in your country use Tor to circumvent censorship.
When you choose this option:
First, Tails synchronizes the clock of the computer automatically, because acorrect time is needed to be able to connect to the Tor network.
Tails learns the current time by connecting to the captive portal detectionservice of Fedora, which is used by most Linuxdistributions. This connection does not go through the Tor network and is anexception to our policy of only making Internet connections through the Tornetwork.
You can learn more about our security assessment of this timesynchronization in our design documentation about non-Tortraffic.
If you choose instead to hide that you are connecting to Tor,you might have to fix the computer clock manually.
If Tails fails to synchronize the clock because you have to sign in to thenetwork using a captive portal, an error screen is displayed that helps youdo so.
For detailed instructions, see how to sign in to the network using acaptive portal.
Then, Tails tries different ways of connecting to Toruntil it succeeds:
Tails tries to connect to Tor directly using public relays, withoutusing a bridge.
Tails tries to connect to Tor using one of the default bridges,already included in Tails, if connecting using public relays fails.
Tails uses the default obfs4 bridges from TorBrowser.
If public relays and default bridges don't work, Tails asks you toconfigure a custom bridge, if connecting using the default bridgesfails.
Someone monitoring your Internet connection could identify these attempts ascoming from a Tails user.
You might need to go unnoticed if using Tor could look suspicious to someonewho monitors your Internet connection.
When you choose this option, Tails will only connect to Tor after you configure a custom Tor bridge. Bridges aresecret Tor relays that hide that you are connecting to Tor.
It is impossible to hide to the websites that you visit that you are usingTor, because the listof exit nodes of the Tor network is public.
Our team is doing its best to help you connect to Tor using the most discreettypes of Tor bridges. That is why, when you decide to hide that you are connecting to Tor:
Tails does not automatically detect whether you have to sign in to thenetwork using a captive portal.
Default bridges are not available.
To learn about other Tor bridges, you have several options listed below.
None of these options is easy to do from Tails, so we recommend that youlearn about several bridges from your regular computer before startingTails and store the bridge lines in a text document on separate USBstick.
After you restarted on Tails, you can copy one of these bridge lines fromthis other USB stick into Tor Connection.
Even someone who knows your bridge cannot know what you are doing online fromTails.
CAPTCHA
You can solve a CAPTCHA on https://bridges.torproject.org/.
We recommend doing so from a differentlocal network if you want to hide that you are connecting to Tor.
Email
You can send an empty email tobridges@torproject.org from aGmail or Riseup email address.
Sending the email reveals to Gmail or Riseup that you are trying toconnect to Tor but not to someone who monitors your Internet connection.
Telegram
You can send the message
/bridges
to@GetBridgesBot on Telegram.
You can only use the types of bridges that our team considers discreet enough.
Currently in Tails, only obfs4 bridges hide that you are using Tor.
To save the last Tor bridge that connected to Tor successfully, turn on theTor Bridge feature of the PersistentStorage.
In the future, we will make it easier to use a custom bridge by:
The status of Tor appears as an onion icon in thenotification area:
You are connected to Tor.
You are not connected to Tor.
See our documentation on troubleshooting connecting to Tor.